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Simon: Family Law - Contested Consent to Adoption: No Longer a Decision

FAMILY LAW-Contested Consent to Adoption: No Longer a Decision
in the Child's Best Interest. In re Adoption of BGD, 713 P.2d 1191
(Wyo. 1986).
In In re Adoption of BGD 1 a fifteen-year-old unwed mother, TD, and
her parents challenged the consent to adoption signed one week before
her daughter's birth. TD's physician facilitated the adoption of TD's child,
BGD, by his office manager and her husband. The physician directed TD
and her mother to the adoptive parents' attorney one week before delivery.
The attorney explained that he represented the adoptive parents, then
discussed the consent and TD's rights.2 TD then signed the irrevocable
adoption consent and relinquishment.
BGD was born on March 22, 1983. 3 The physician removed her from
the hospital and placed BGD with the adoptive parents seven hours after
her birth. 4 The adoptive parents' attorney filed the adoption papers the
next morning.5
On May 9, 1983, TD 6 sued the adoptive parents to set aside the adoption consent and have the child returned.7 The court denied summary judgment for the defendants.' At trial TD claimed that the physician pressured
her into consenting to the adoption and that she did not understand the
consent. TD also claimed that she demanded to keep her baby at
delivery. 1" Although the physician acknowledged that TD was "ambivalent" about the adoption, he testified that she did not clearly indicate
her intent to keep B GD until the morning after delivery." The trial court
found for the defendants, holding that TD's revocation was untimely.'2
On appeal TD argued that her written consent was invalid because
she lacked the necessary understanding and intent to relinquish her parental rights to BGD. 1" She maintained that she had acted under4 the physician's undue influence and that her revocation was timely.'
1. In re Adoption of BGD, 713 P.2d 1191 (Wyo. 1986) [hereinafter BGD 1], aff'd on
rehearing,719 P.2d 1373 (Wyo. 1986) [hereinafter BGD Ill. This casenote generally addresses
the original opinion, BGD 1, 713 P.2d 1191 (Wyo. 1986). Also, it is primarily concerned with
contested consent to adoption cases, as compared to cases involving divorce custody disputes,
parental abandonment or termination of parental rights. Judicial considerations and child
placement standards in those situations may differ.
2. Brief for Appellee at 1-6, BGD I (No. 85-1). For appellant's account of this litigation, see Brief for Appellant at 1-3, BGD I (No. 85-1).
3. BGD II, 719 P.2d at 1374.
4. BGD 1, 713 P.2d at 1192.
5. Id
6. Plaintiffs include TD and her parents, JD and ZD.
7. BGD I, 713 P.2d at 1192.
8. Brief for Appellant at 2, 3.
9. Id at 12.
10. BGD II, 719 P.2d at 1374.
11. BGD I, 713 P.2d at 1192.
12. Id.
13. Brief of Appellant at 9.
14. Id at 4, 12.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1987

1

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 22 [1987], Iss. 1, Art. 12
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXII

The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed, holding that Section
1-22-109(a) of the Wyoming Statutes 5 requires a relinquishment statement separate from the written consent.", It also ruled that Section
1-22-109(c)' 7 requires written relinquishment after the child's delivery. 8
The court also indicated that "physical relinquishment"'" of the child was
necessary and found that the natural mother failed to physically relinquish BGD. 1 The court's analysis focused on the adoption statute which
21
does not incorporate consideration of the "best interests" of the child.
One dissenting justice rejected the majority's statutory interpretation and
urged adherence to the "best interests" doctrine.22
The adoptive parents petitioned for rehearing alleging that the court
failed to follow the trial court's findings of fact. They contended that the
best interests of the child should be the controlling factor in adoption cases
and asked that the court's statutory interpretation only be applied prospectively.2 3 Further, they petitioned for an evaluation by the Department
of Public Assistance and Social Service to determine the child's best
custody interests.2' The court granted only the petition for26rehearing.2 5
Upon rehearing the court reaffirmed its previous decision.
15. WYo. STAT. § 1-22-109(a) (1977) provides:
A written relinquishment of the child and written consent to adoption shall
be filed with the petition to adopt and shall be signed by:
(i) Both parents, if living, or
(ii) The surviving parent; or
(iii) The mother and putative father of the child if the name of the putative
father is known; or
(iv) The mother alone if she does not know the name of the putative father,
in which case she shall sign and file an affidavit so stating ....
16. BGD , 713 P.2d at 1192-93.
17. Wo. STAT. § 1-22-109(c) (1977) provides that "[tihe consent may be signed at any
time and shall be acknowledged before a notary public ..
18. BGD I, 713 P.2d at 1193.
19. Id
20. Id The trial court held (1) that T.D. signed the consent of her own free will, (2)
that she intended to place her child for adoption, (3)that she had ample opportunity to reconsider and withdraw her consent during the week prior to delivery, (4)that she failed to communicate her desire to revoke consent until the morning after delivery when the adoption
petition had already been filed, and (5) that T.D. was "very immature and had little touch
with reality." See BGD II, 719 P.2d at 1380-81 n.2 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting).
The Wyoming Supreme Court generally limits appellate reviews to the factual findings
made by the trial court. McColley v. State ex. reL Wyoming Workers Compensation Div.,
708 P.2d 441 (Wyo. 1985). The trial court made no specific finding of fact concerning "physical
relinquishment," although the physician's testimony indicated that TD knew the adoptive
parents would receive BGD the night of delivery.
21. BOD I, 713 P.2d at 1193, 1194.
22. Id at 1193 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting).
23. Appellee's Brief in Support of Petition for Rehearing at 1, 2, BGD 1 (No. 85-1)
[hereinafter Appellee's Brief, Petition for Rehearing].
24. Petition for the Appointment of Western County Depass [sic] as Guardian Ad Litem
to Investigate the Parties to Aid in Determining what is in the Best Interest of BGD, a
Minor, at 103, BGD I (No. 85-1).
25. In re Adoption of BGD, 716 P.2d 983 (Wyo. 1986) (order granting petition for
rehearing).
26. BGD 11, 719 P.2d 1373 (Wyo. 1986).
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In re Adoption of BGD was a difficult case which sparked an emotional public controversy.17 The case raises many questions concerning
consent to adoption, parental rights and the rights of infants in adoption.
This casenote examines the court's interpretation and application of the
adoption statutes in relation to its previous adoption decisions which were
based on the child's best interests.
BACKGROUND

Legislative History
Natural parents have the constitutional right to rear their children
without undue state interference.28 Adoption, which creates a parent/child
relationship between persons unrelated by blood,29 is a statutory procedure.30 A child may be adopted only with the natural parent's consent
or after judicial determination that the natural parent has lost all legal
rights to the child.3
Early Wyoming adoption laws required only that the natural parents'
written consent accompany the adoption petition.2 Although the 1963
statutes mentioned the term "relinquish, '33 it was not until 1977 that the
Wyoming adoption statutes required written relinquishment. 4 Relinquishment indicates the parents' intent "to abandon, to give up, [and] to
5
the child. Consent is an agreement to a course of action or
surrender""
36
decision.
Section 1-22-111 of the Wyoming Statutes also addresses the adoption decree, investigation and denial of adoption. 37 This section, dating
27. Id. at 1373 (Brown, J., specially concurring).
28. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (the due process clause); see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 232-33 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 309, 399 (1923); see also Note, Natural Parent Preference or the Child's Best Interests: The Court's Dilemma in S.O. v. W.S., 12 U.C.L.A.-ALASKA L. REV. 141 (1982-83).
29. BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 13 (2d ed. 1984) ("Adoption").
30. Lucas v. Strauser, 65 Wyo. 98, 110, 196 P.2d 862, 866 (1948).
31. See Wyo. STAT. §§ 1-22-109 to -111 (1977).
32. BGD I, 713 P.2d at 1194 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting); see also 1929 Wyo. Sess. Laws,
ch. 121.
33. BGD 1, 713 P.2d at 1194 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting); 1963 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch.
59 § 6.
34. BGD 1,713 P.2d at 1194 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting); Wyo. STAT. § 1-22-104(c)(ii)
(1977 Supp. 1986).
35. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1161 (5th ed. 1979) ("Relinquish").
36. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 283 (1982) ("Consent").
37. WYo. SWAT. § 1-22-111 (1977) states:
(a) After the petition to adopt has been filed and a hearing held the court acting in the best interest and welfare of the child may make any of the following
orders:
(i) Enter an interlocutory decree of adoption giving the care and custody
of the child to the petitioners pending further order of the court;
(ii) Defer entry of an interlocutory decree of adoption and order the division of public assistance and social services ... or a private licensed agency
to investigate and report to the court the background of the child and of the
petitioners.... [Tlhe court shall determine if the adoption by petitioners is
in the best interest and welfare of the child .. "
(b) If the court denies the adoption it shall make an order for proper custody
consistent with the best interest of the child.
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back to 1876, allows the court to order custody "consistent with the best
interest and welfare of the child. 3 8 The court may also order an investigation of the child's, the natural parents' and the adoptive parents' backgrounds to determine if adoption is in the child's best welfare."
Case Law
The Wyoming Supreme Court has long considered the best interests
of the child in adoption cases.4 0 In the 1949 case of Morris v. Jackson,
Justice Riner, speaking for the court, stated, "[Tlhe legal right of the
parent is secondary to the best interest of the child, and such right will
not be enforced where it is not advantageous to the child." 41
In Morris, the six-year-old child lived with the adoptive family for
several years before the natural father attempted to regain custody.2
Although the natural father had provided limited care for the infant, he
was never notified of the adoption proceedings, contrary to the adoption
statutes.43 The court, leaving the child with his adoptive parents, stated
that "the paramount question at all times, when the custody and control
of a minor child is in dispute, is the welfare of such child. That has been
declared to be the rule by this court a number of times.""
The Wyoming Supreme Court in more recent cases, reaffirmed its commitment to resolving adoption disputes in favor of the child's best interest.
In In re Adoption of D.P.and F.P., a 1978 decision, the stepmother was
allowed to adopt her stepsons despite the natural mother's attempt to
revoke her consents to adoption. 45 The court determined that the consent
was validly received; but, more importantly, the boys' adoptive home
6
served the children's best interests.4
In 1982, the court considered the case of a New York mother who consented to the adoption of her infant by a Wyoming couple. 7 Shortly after
placing the child with the adoptive parents in Wyoming, the natural
mother attempted to withdraw her consent. The court held that the trial
court correctly applied Wyoming adoption statutes and also properly considered the child's best interests in reaching the decision. 48 In addition
to considering the child's best interests,49 the court relied on section
38. 1876 Wyo. Territorial Sess. Laws, ch. 2, § 3.
39. WYo. SrAT. § 1-22-111(ii) (1977).
40. See BGD 1, 713 P.2d at 1193, 1194 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting).
41. Morris v. Jackson, 66 Wyo. 369, 380, 212 P.2d 78, 82 (1949) (quoting 39 C.J.S.
Habeaus Corpus § 416, at 572-73 (1944)).
42. Id. at 373-78, 212 P.2d at 79-81.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 381, 212 P.2d at 82 (quoting Kennison v. Chokie, 55 Wyo. 421, 425, 100 P.2d
97, 97 (1940)).
45. In re Adoption of DP & FP, 583 P.2d 706 (Wyo. 1978).
46. Id. at 708-709.
47. In re Adoption of MM, 652 P.2d 974 (Wyo. 1982).
48. Id. at 979-981; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 289 & comments (a), (b) (1971) (discussing application of local adoption law hearings).
49. In re Adoption of MM, 652 P.2d at 980, 981.
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1-22-109, finding that the mother had voluntarily signed a valid consent.
Therefore, the consent was irrevocable. 5 The child remained with the adoptive parents.51
In In re adoption of Voss, the court considered the benefits a child
of divorced parents receives from association with his natural father as
well as his step-family.52 The natural father sought to block adoption by
the stepfather, wanting only to reestablish his visitation rights. 53 The
court, noting that the child would not be displaced, acknowledged that
parents have the first and natural right to their children. It indicated that
the child had an interest in sharing a warm and active relationship with
a natural parent, if possible. Here the court decided for the natural father
after considering his and the child's mutual rights and benefits.5
A majority of courts accept the "best interest of the child" as a
primary factor in adoption cases.55 The New Jersey Supreme Court strongly adheres to the "best interest" doctrine. In Sorentino v.Family and
Children'sSociety of Elizabeth,16 the court found that the child's natural
mother had signed the consent for adoption under undue influence.57 The
child was thirty-one months old at the time of the decision. Concerned
about the emotional consequences of displacement, the court ordered a
special evaluation and hearing to determine the child's best interests. It
observed, "The court cannot evade its responsibility as parens partriae
of all minor children, to preserve them from harm. The possibility of serious
psychological harm to the child in this case transcends all other considerations. 5 8 After the trial court found that transferring the child from his
custodial parent would be harmful, the supreme court allowed the adoptive mother to file the adoption proceedings.55
In Alaska when the natural parent consents to the child's adoption
and then seeks to withdraw consent no parental preference is given in
determining what is in the child's best interest.60 In S.O. v. W.S., the court
held that because the natural mother's consent substantially complied
with the statutory requirements, she had sufficiently expressed her
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See id at 978.
See id. at 981.
In re Adoption of Voss, 550 P.2d 481, 486 (Wyo. 1976).
Id.
Id.
In re Adoption of MM, 652 P.2d 974, 980 (Wyo. 1982) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 289 comment (a) (1971)). See also NaturalParent Preference,
12 U.C.L.A.-ALASKA L. REV. at 141, 142 n.11.
56. Sorentino v. Family & Children's Soc'y of Elizabeth, 72 N.J. 127, 367 A.2d 1168
(1976); Sorentino v. Family & Children's Soc'y of Elizabeth, 74 N.J. 313, 378 A.2d 18, 21-22
(1977).
57. Sorentino, 72 N.J. 127, 367 A.2d at 1169. "Undue influence" is defined as one party having an unfair advantage over another based on real or apparent "authority, knowledge

of necessity or distress, or a fiduciary or confidential relationship."

BAREON'S LAW DICTIONARY

497 (1984).
58. Sorentino, 72 N.J. 127, 367 A.2d at 1171 (citations omitted).
59. Sorentino, 74 N.J. 127, 378 A.2d at 18.
60. S.O. v. W.S., 643 P.2d 997, 1005 (Alaska 1982).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1987

5

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 22 [1987], Iss. 1, Art. 12
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXII

intent to relinquish the
child.6 In his best interests, the child was left with
62
the adoptive parents.
A minority of states do not consider the child's best interests in adoption cases. 63 The Oregon Court of Appeals observed: "Where circumstances
have indicated that consent was not given freely and knowingly, we have
allowed the natural parent to disavow it, even though it was clearly in
the best interests of the child to remain with the adoptive parents."64
The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that a child's best interest
is to be reared by the natural mother unless she is incapable of the responsibility.65 Utah courts also follow this rationale although it may be overcome by "clear and convincing evidence.'"66 Courts that follow the "parental right" preference focus on the natural parent's rights and try to
preserve the family unit as a matter of public policy.67
THE PRINCIPAL CASE

The BGD court decided the matter on a strict, technical interpretation of the adoption consent statutes. 1 Section 1-22-104(c)(i) requires written statements showing that the person with legal custody prior to adoption "has duly relinquished the child to the petitioners for adoption."6 9
Section 1-22-109(a) states: "A written relinquishment of the child and written consent to adoption shall be filed with the petition to adopt ...."
The court focused on the written relinquishment and written consent
clauses. It interpreted this section to mean that a relinquishment must
be a statement separate and distinct from the consent."0 Additionally the
majority ruled that the separate "written relinquishment" must be given
after the child's birth since no child exists until birth.' This interpretation prevents the natural mother from consenting to adoption prematurely
'7 2
while "under the stress of unfortunate and unhappy circumstances."
TD signed the following document prior to delivery. 73 It reads in part:
That I, [TD], do hereby voluntarily and freely give my full and
free consent to the adoption of my child by [LDP] and [MFP, it
61. ld at 1000.
62. Id at 1002.
63. NaturalParentPreference, 12 U.C.L.A.-ALASKA L. REV. at 142 n.ll, 149; see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 289, at 264.
64. In re Adoption of Vaida, 34 Or. App. 631, 579 P.2d 313, 315-316 (1978).
65. In re Alsdurf's Petition, 270 Minn. 236, 133 N.W.2d 479, 482 (1965).
66. D.P. v. Social Serv. & Child Welfare Dep't, 19 Utah 2d 311, 431 P.2d 547 (1967).
67. Natural ParentPreference, 12 U.C.L.A.-ALASKA L. REV. at 142 n.11, 149.
68. BGD 1,713 P.2d 1192.
69. WYo. STAT. § 1-22-104(c) (1977 & Supp. 1986) reads:
The following documents shall be filed with every petition to adopt a child:
(i) The appropriate consent to adoption pursuant to 1-22-109;
(ii) Any relinquishments necessary to show the court that the person or
agency legally authorized to have custody and control of the child prior to the
adoption, has duly relinquished the child to the petitioners for adoption[.]
70. BGD 1, 713 P.2d at 1192-93.
71. Id. at 1193.
72. Id.
73. Brief for Appellee at 4.
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being understood by me that in giving such consent that I am
relinquishingall of my rights of whatsoever nature in and to said
child and that said child can never be claimed by me and that this
consent is irrevocable.
That believing it to be for the best interest of the said child, I do
hereby voluntarily relinquish and release forever all right, claim,
interest and control which I may have in and to said child, and
that I do hereby voluntarily relinquish and release unto the abovenamed adoptingparents the lawful physical custody and control
of my said child .... 14
The court concluded that the document was invalid."8 It failed to provide adequate written relinquishment as required by section 1-22-109(a)
because at the time TD signed, her child did not yet exist. 6 In addition,
there was no separate relinquishment statement." The court also held that
although the statute allowed the consent to be signed at any time, the
statutory language omitted the word relinquishment.' Therefore, a relinquishment could be signed only after the child's birth."9 The majority
justified its interpretation by noting that other states safeguard the
natural mother's rights to her child by requiring either relinquishment
after birth, consent signed before a judge or provisions for withdrawal
of consent."0
The Wyoming Supreme Court also found that TD did not "physically" relinquish the child, because the physician took the baby from the
hospital without the mother's knowledge.8 ' The court did not indicate
which statutory provision requires "physical" relinquishment, nor did it
specify what behavior fulfills this requirement."
As noted, the Wyoming Supreme Court previously examined adoption cases in light of the child's best interestsA' The majority opinion
stated: "The policy of this court, in adoption cases, is to look at what is
best for the child under all circumstances."1 4 The court, although not
specifically over-ruling this
policy, elected to apply the statutes to sus85
tain the natural family.
On rehearing, the court considered leaving the child with her adoptive parents because of their three year association. It rejected this, com74. BGD II, 719 P.2d at 1378-79 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied).
75. BGD I, 713 P.2d at 1193.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See id.
79. See iU
80. BGD II, 719 P.2d at 1377-78.
81. BGD 1, 713 P.2d at 1193.
82. Id.
83. In re Adoption of MM, 652 P.2d 974, 980 IWyo. 1982); In re Adoption of DP &
FP, 583 P.2d 706, 709 (Wyo. 1978); Morris v. Jackson, 66 Wyo. 369, 380, 212 P.2d 78, 82
(1949); Kennison v. Chokie, 55 Wyo. 421, 427, 100 P.2d 97, 97 (1940).
84. BGD 1, 713 P.2d at 1193.
85. Id
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paring it to awarding "custody to a parent who kidnaps children and hides
them for three years while bonding occurs." 6
ANALYSIS

The court's interpretation of the "Consent to adoption" statute81 is
narrowly conceived. Although no express statutory language mentions
separate documents, the court read section 1-22-109(a) to require "a written relinquishment of the child and written consent to adoption .
"..."88
The court reasoned that because section 1-22-109(c) allowed consent
anytime, but required written relinquishment after childbirth, section (a)
must require two documents." Therefore, the mother could give signed
consent prior to delivery, but she could only agree to relinquish the child
after birth.
The statutory interpretations seem inconsistent. The court liberally
construed section 1-22-109(a) to mean "separate" consent and relinquishments were required, even though the word "separate" is not in the
statute. However, it strictly construed the wording in section 1-22-109(c)
by insisting that "consent" did not include relinquishment, although other
sections using "consent" suggest that it does. 8
The court's strained construction apparently failed to satisfy the
legislative intent. Immediately following publication of the first BGD decision, the 1986 Wyoming Legislature enacted section 1-22-109(e).8 ' It provides that "[t]he consent to adoption and the relinquishment of a child
for adoption may be contained in a single instrument. A separate postbirth written or physical relinquishment is not required."'92 The court is
highly critical of the new legislation. 3 The new statute, however, allows
consent and relinquishment to be signed at any time, 94 encouraging early
and reliable adoption arrangements. This prevents delays between childbirth and placement, thus decreasing waiting periods which are psycho86. BGD I1, 719 P.2d at 1373, 1378.
87. WYo. STAT. § 1-22-109 (1977 & Supp. 1986).
88. BGD I, 713 p.2a at 1193.
89. See BGD 1, 713 P.2d at 1193.
90. The legislature, in several statutes, seems to suggest that the consent and relinquishment can be contained in the same document. The statutory language of § 1-22-109
Consent to adoption,does not specify that the consent and relinquishment must be separate
documents. Also, Wyo. STAT. § 1-22-107(a) (1977), amended by 1983 Wyo. Special Sess. Laws,
ch. 16, § 1, allows a default judgment against a parent who does not consent to adoption
and who fails to respond after notice of the adoption has been given. The statute refers to
entry of the judgment for "consent" only. If the court's interpretation of § 1-22-109(a) is
followed, it would be impossible to enter a default judgment for the adoptive parents, because
a separate order of "relinquishment" would also be required. Section 1-22-107(a) does not
address an order for relinquishment. See also BGD I, 713 P.2d at 1194 (Thomas, C.J.,
dissenting).
91. 1986 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 118.
92. WYo. STAT. § 22-109(e). See also 1986 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 118.
93. BGD II, 719 P.2d at 1376. Justice Cardine, writing for the majority on rehearing,
was extremely critical of the new legislation. He noted, "The statute was hastily written,
poorly conceived and stands alone among the statutes of the fifty states."
94. WYo. STAT. § 1-22-109(e) (1986).
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logically harmful to the development of a healthy adoptive parent-child
relationship."
Despite recent statutory changes, the majority on rehearing encouraged the legislature to revise Wyoming's adoption statutes. The court
urged statutory clarification of natural parent, adoptive parent, and child
rights.9 6 The court warned that "[ilf no action is taken it seems clear that
we can expect more controversy and more litigation of this kind."97
Departure from Precedent
The court failed to follow its own precedent of placing the child with
those who can provide for his best welfare.9 8 Adoption proceedings require
the judge to act as a "wise, affectionate and careful parent." 99 Courts must
grant custody in a manner promoting the child's welfare.10 Determining
the child's best welfare requires a complicated judicial comparison of factors including "the character and maturity of the parents, their commitment to the care of the child, the child's present bonds of affection, the
family setting and stability ... which together form the foundation for
a stable and happy home for the child."' 0'1 Young children, lacking awareness of the biological family,' become emotionally attached to the "psychological parent," who provides regular care and affection.103 The earlier
the child is permanently placed in the adoptive home, the stronger the
psychological parent-child relationship will be. 10 4 If another adult displaces
the psychological parent, the child regresses emotionally, socially and
physically. The psychological parent's role cannot be as satisfactorily
fulfilled by an adult who has been absent or inactive in the child's early
care as by the original psycholgical parent." 5
In BGD, the child's best interest dictated that her three year relationship with her psychological parents should not have been interrupted.
She should have been "protected against intrusion by the state on behalf
of other adults."" 6 In Morris, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that the
95. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A.

SOLNIT, BEYOND THE

BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD

22, 35, 45-46 (1973) [hereinafter J. GOLDSTEIN]. It is also more difficult to find adoptive homes
unless adoption consents are "consistently treated like irrevocable contracts." Small v. Andrews, 20 Or. App. 6, 530 P.2d 540, 545 (1975). Adoptive parents are less willing to become
involved in a parent-child relationship which may be unexpectedly terminated.
96. BGD I, 719 P.2d at 1377-78.
97. Id. at 1378.
98. In re Adoption of MM, 652 P.2d 974, 980 (Wyo. 1982); in re Adoption of DP and
FP, 583 P.2d 706, 709 (Wyo. 1978); Morris v. Jackson, 66 Wyo. 369, 380, 212 P.2d 78, 82
(1949); Kennison v. Chokie, 55 Wyo. 421, 427, 100 P.2d 97, 97 (1940).
99. Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 434, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (1925) (quoting Queen v.
Gyngall, [1893] 2 Q.B. 232).
100. See J. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 95, at 11.
101. S.O. v. W.S., 643 P.2d 997, 1006 (Alaska 1982) (quoting In re Anderson, 99 Idaho
805, 589 P.2d 957, 974 (1979) (Bakes, J., dissenting)).
102. J. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 95, at 17.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 22.
105. Id at 18-19.
106. See id at 105-106.
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child's welfare superseded the biological parents' claims."' There, as in
BGD, a violation of the adoption statutes could have blocked legal adoption, but the court left the child with the adoptive parents for his best
welfare. 0 8 In BGD, the court failed to consider the child's psychological
status or to follow precedent which has, until now, consistently solved
these adoption dilemmas by adhering to the "best interests" policy. 10 9
The Wyoming Supreme Court also failed to consider prospective
statutory application, a doctrine the court has previously applied to
achieve the interests of justice." 0 The child's protection should be the
court's main concern when considering adoption issues."' The court's decision requiring separate consent and relinquishment documents and a postbirth relinquishment was based on a statutory interpretation not anticipated by the parties and not before the court."2 Further, the delays which
made displacement of the three-year-old so psychologically damaging were
primarily attributable to the judicial system."' Prospectively applying
its decision would have avoided the delayed displacement of BGD and
would have furthered the court's "best interest" standard, thus yielding
a more reasonable result.
The Wyoming Supreme Court should adopt clear guidelines for adoption disputes which will better assist Wyoming courts and attorneys in
protecting children's best interests. First, the court should allow a child
full party status and separate legal counsel in disputes involving custody
decisions or potential displacement from the child's present home. I" The
child is an indispensable party;' ' the results of the proceedings will directly
affect his personal rights and interests. Adult parties represent their own
hearts and minds. ", Second, the court should consider the natural parents'
rights, but balance those rights with the child's best welfare. The child's
welfare is the primary factor considered by courts in adoption cases
107. Morris v. Jackson, 66 Wyo. 369, 212 P.2d 78 (1949).
108. Id at 389, 212 P.2d at 86.
109. In re Adoption of MM, 652 P.2d 974, 980 (Wyo. 1982); In re Adoption of DP and
FP, 583 P.2d 706, 709 (Wyo. 1978); Morris v. Jackson, 66 Wyo. 369, 380, 212 P.2d 78, 82
(1949); Kennison v. Chokie, 55 Wyo. 421, 427, 100 P.2d 97, 97 (1940).
110. Adkins v. Sky Blue, Inc., 701 P.2d 549, 551 (Wyo. 1985); Ostwald v. State, 538
P.2d 1298, 1303 (Wyo. 1975).
111. J. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 95, at 65, 66, 105, 108-10.
112. Appellee's Brief, Petition for Rehearing at 12. Contrary to the decision in BGD,
the Wyoming Supreme Court has a standard appellate rule that "issues not raised before
the trial court will not be considered for the first time on appeal." In re State Bank Charter
Application, 606 P.2d 296, 300 (Wyo. 1980); see also Scherling v. Kilgore, 599 P.2d 1352,
1358 (Wyo. 1979); Schaefer v. Lampert Lumber Co., 591 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Wyo. 1979).
113. The initial complaint was filed on April 29, 1983. The adoptive parents moved for
summary judgment on August 8, 1983; that hearing was postponed until September 23, 1983
at the request of TD. The district court denied summary judgment six months later in March,
1984. The trial was delayed until June 28, 1984, at TD's request. The trial court found for
the adoptive parents on February 28, 1985, twenty-two months after filing the initial complaint. Appeal to the Wyoming Supreme Court exhausted an additional fourteen months,
ending with the rehearing decision on May 30, 1986. Appellees Brief on Order Granting
Rehearing at 7-8, BGD 11 (No. 85-1).
114. J. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 95, at 65.
115. Id
116. Id at 65-66.
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throughout the country and is strongly supported by child development
specialists.1 1 7 Third, the court should appoint impartial, qualified child
development agencies to evaluate and recommend conditions that constitute the child's best interest." 8 Fourth, the child should not be displaced
until after the final decision, nor should interim visitation rights be ordered
if not previously established." ' These measures decrease the child's confusion and prevent what may be unnecessary psychological trauma. Finally, the court should protect the rights of the intervening biological or adoptive parent, as well as the child, by rapidly facilitating trials and appeals. 120
By establishing a timetable for hearings and decisions early in the litigation the court is more likely to resolve the dispute rapidly, minimizing
psychological disruption for all parties.

CONCLUSION

Natural parents have the first right to custody of their children.' 2 '
Voluntary written consent and relinquishment to place a child for adoption, however, is irrevocable by statute and it terminates the natural
parent's right to custody of the child.'2 2 In BGD,the Wyoming Supreme
Court construed the adoption statute to require written relinquishment
both separate from the consent and effective only after delivery. ' The
legislature clearly disagreed with the court's statutory interpretations.
It immediately passed new legislation specifically allowing consent to
in a single instrument with
adoption and relinquishment to be contained
24
no post-birth relinquishments required.
The court's failure to follow its precedent of considering the child's
best interest in adoption cases should cause great public and parental concern for the children who will find their futures placed in the hands of this
court. The three-year-old child in BGD was taken from her psychological
parents and placed with a family of strangers without evaluating or considering her developmental or physical well-being. The court rejected its
long-standing practice of weighing the child's best interests above other
and chose to follow its
factors. Instead, it applied the statutes strictly
"predilection to sustain the natural family.' 2 5
117. BGD II, 719 P.2d at 1381-84. (Urbigkit, J., dissenting) (quoting Natural Parent
Preference, 12 U.C.L.A.-ALASKA L. REV. at 149).
118. One author has detailed specific guidelines to evaluate a child's best interests in
custody disputes. Natural Parent Preference, 12 U.C.L.A.-ALASKA L. REV. at 153.
119. J. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 95, at 101.
120. Id.
121. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (the due process clause); see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 232-33 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 309, 399 (1923); see also NaturalParent Preference,12 U.C.L.A.-ALASKA L. REV.
141 (1982-83).
122. See Wyo. STAT. §§ 1-22-104, -109 (1977 & Supp. 1986); see also id § 1-22-114(a) (1977).
123. BGD 1, 713 P.2d at 1193.
124. WYO. STAT. § 1-22-109(e) (1986); see also 1986 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 118.

125. BGD L 713 P.2d at 1193.
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The court should reaffirm that its paramount concern in adoption cases
is the child's best welfare. Revised legislation and adoption of judicial
guidelines will further assure that the child's legal rights are more fully
protected.
KATHLEEN
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